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The importance of ratings for investors’ decisions and for the perceptions of 
the financial health of a nation pointed out the need that credit rating agen-
cies should be regulated in some way. Regulators and market participants 
believed that the credit rating agencies need to abide by standards of cor-
porate governance and supervision due to their pivotal role in the US sub-
prime crisis. This belief was amplified recently because the rating agencies 
were deeply involved in the European debt crisis after various sovereign 
debt ratings were significantly downgraded. Therefore, the paper highlights 
the critique against the agencies’ role in the two most recent crises and re-
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 1. Introduction 
Since the 2007 financial crisis, the credibility of the three major rating agencies; including 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, had been adversely hit given that their rating practices 
proved to be at the heart of the crisis and that the rating agencies played a pivotal role in chasing 
a global financial meltdown. Accordingly, the rating agencies faced critiques against their stake 
in the crisis, and in response to their central role in bringing down global financial markets; regu-
latory proposals were put forward to address the major criticisms that the agencies faced.  
Along with the discussions of regulatory reforms, the anger fumes against the credit rating agen-
cies gradually faded away until the moment that the rating agencies announced sharp down-
grades of European Sovereign debt, which started, with Greek debt in late 2009. After down-
grading Greece, the role of rating agencies and their influence came under harsh spotlight again 
and once more anger fumes mounted against the agencies questioning the accuracy of the agen-
cies’ rating assessments that are the heart of the efficient performance of world economies.  
As a follow up of the subprime crises, the credit rating agencies were criticized of creating 
boom-bust cycles because of issuing investment grade ratings on novel structured products 
backed by subprime credits (Verschoor 2007). Since the 2007 crisis, regulatory proposals were 
directed to the agencies due to their pivotal and critical role in the financial sphere (e.g. Sy 
2009). However, although these proposals have been made, no action has been taken so far, so 
the rating agencies are again accused of triggering a European crisis and they have been under 
further blames and criticisms as a result of the sudden and continuous downgrades of highly-
rated sovereign debts (Warner 2010, Reisen 2010). This paper points out the two critical inci-
dents that crystallized the role of the rating agencies and that there were regulatory proposals 
being announced in response of the 2007 crisis, but in face of the current European crisis, it is 
evident that those proposed regulations were not applied as put forward.  
Thus, the principle motivation of the paper is to identify that the major downgrades by the rating 
agencies of financial products either of structured finance products or of sovereign debt result in 
systemic panics and financial instability given that the rating agencies’ announcements influence 
the investors’ perceptions of a country’s economic outlook and financial health. The paper high-
lights the critical role of the rating agencies in the two most recent crises starting with their role    2 
 
 
in amplifying the 2007 financial crisis, and their role in bringing down world economies by their 
sudden and major downgrades of European Sovereign debt including Greece and also of the sub-
sequent downgrades of Spain and Portugal. Lastly, the paper reviews the regulatory proposals 
that were called for in the wake of the 2007 global crisis and questions whether such regulations 
were yet put into practice or not amid the influential effect of the rating downgrades of European 
debt.    
2. The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Financial Crisis 
In the financial sphere, the rating agencies play a vital role, but nevertheless they are among the 
least understood and one of the least regulated players. Since the beginning of the subprime 
meltdown, the market observers had criticized the role of the rating agencies as being critical 
players in the evolution and severity of the subprime crisis because the agencies helped in the 
massive growth and fast development of the structured finance market.  
The credit rating agencies (CRAs) have been under the cloud of criticism following the collapse 
of the US subprime mortgage market for several reasons. One of the questions asked was tack-
ling the accuracy of the structured finance rating methodologies. This question was raised as a 
follow up of the elevating delinquencies occurred on structured finance products; an effect which 
was responded by massive downgrades from the rating agencies. As it is well known, the results 
continued to spread beyond the mortgage market and beyond the borders of the United States to 
the extent that the subprime crisis is considered to be the first global financial crisis of the 21
st 
century.    
On one hand, the rating agencies were the primary raters of the structured finance Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDOs) backed by assets of dubious quality, such as the subprime credits, and 
on the other hand the rating agencies are blamed of publishing exaggerated ratings on over-
sophisticated products that were backed by toxic assets. The problematic role of the rating agen-
cies was when the highly rated CDO tranches, rated as high as AAA, started to default and to be 
significantly downgraded by the rating agencies. Since that the CDO tranches’ performance de-
pended on the performance of their underlying assets, thus, when the majority, if not all, of the 
subprime borrowers started to default and become unable to pay back their mortgage credits the    3 
 
 
rating agencies did not have any other option than to quickly downgrade the defaulting CDO 
tranches that created a systemic panic around the globe (BIS 2005, 22).  
Since summer 2007, problems with the ratings were revealed and the rating agencies have been 
blamed of signaling a false sense of security about the credit-worthiness of the complex and 
novel structured finance products. Furthermore, a chain of adverse events occurred, leading to a 
systemic crisis when the CRAs started to significantly downgrade the exaggerated initial ratings 
of structured finance products, leading to a crisis of confidence in the global financial system. 
The tragic story continued when the equity or the unrated CDO tranches did not act as safety 
cushions to protect the highly-rated CDOs from default; simply because the losses were signifi-
cant enough to the extent that the initial rating of highly rated CDOs had to be downgraded from 
AAA to junk status.  
Therefore, the rating agencies are blamed of publishing ratings that did not reflect the true risk of 
the CDO deals. Three major points of criticism have been raised, namely model risk, conflict of 
interest and lack of transparency.   
Since the rating agencies played a significant role in rating the novel structured finance CDOs by 
issuing investment grade ratings that were later sharply downgraded, the market participants 
have been pointing out the problem of model risk that exists in the applied rating models. Hence, 
the first criticism the rating agencies received identified technical problems in the rating method-
ologies used for the rating of structured finance CDOs. As the name suggests, model risk relates 
to potential errors in the quantitative models and in the accuracy of the assumptions fed into their 
specific rating methodologies (BIS 2005, 49; Fender and Mitchell 2005, 9-13). The sharp down-
grades of the initial AAA-ratings manifest an underestimation of the default risk and correlation 
among the underlying assets and that the rating agencies were over-optimistic regarding the 
housing bubble and that they expected that the real estate prices would continue to increase 
(Fender and Mitchell 2005, 9-13), thus, pointing out that model risk is an important concern aris-
ing from the complexity of the structured finance CDOs that questioned the reliability and credi-
bility of the quantitative rating methodologies.  
A second major criticism arises from the business model itself. Since the inception of the struc-
tured finance market, the issuers of the structured finance products were keen to obtain ratings 
from the prominent CRAs in order to use those ratings as sell triggers to attract global investors.    4 
 
 
Due to the market participants’ over-reliance on such ratings, the structured finance market be-
came a promising and growing business segment for the rating agencies to the extent that it 
turned out to be one of the biggest markets for the agencies, regardless of the novelty and com-
plexity of the structured finance products (Fender and Mitchell 2005, 72-73; Kiff 2010, 2). The 
problem arising here is conflict of interest; it has three angles from which the rating agencies are 
blamed.  
The first issue is related to the current business model, the CRAs are paid solely by the issuers, 
and not by the market investors that use the ratings to make informed investment decisions. The 
problem does not only lie on who pays the agencies, but also in the fact that such issuer-fees 
constitute a significant percentage of the agencies’ revenues, especially as the structured finance 
ratings proved to be the most profitable segment for the agencies. The issuer-paying model had 
created biased incentives for the rating agencies when the agency has the interest to be selected 
by the issuer by giving a better rating to the structured finance deals than any competitor in order 
to keep the business going with this issuers (Hunt No Year, 32-35). Therefore, the issuer-paying 
model creates the incentive for the issuer to shop-rate the agency that publishes the most favor-
able and highest-possible ratings for their deals. A higher rating enables the issuer to better place 
the structured finance products in the financial markets by citing the high ratings published by 
the so-called chosen rating agencies. Consequently, the apparent deficiencies in the rating proc-
ess and the major downgrades in the structured finance initial ratings question the inherit con-
flicts of interest under the issuer-paying model of CRAs (SEC 2008, 25-26). 
The second angle of conflict of interest is based on the unsolicited credit ratings that the agencies 
would publish for a non-client issuer of structured finance deals. This had created pressure and 
motivation for the issuers to pay the agencies as high fees as possible in order to receive high 
ratings for their structured finance CDOs; therefore avoiding the (lower) ratings they would re-
ceive if they do not do business with any of the three prominent rating agencies. Therefore, the 
issuers of such complex deals were keen to obtain ratings by the CRAs to make the marketability 
of their novel products easier. The issuers believed that purchasing ratings and paying the agen-
cies high fees would improve the ratings they receive for their products. 
The last but critical angle of conflict of interest is that the rating agencies did not stop at only 
quantitatively rating the structured finance deals, but they went beyond that to the extent that the    5 
 
 
agencies had an active and integral role in the structuring of specific CDO deals. The agencies 
had provided the issuers with advisory and consultancy services that they were paid for in order 
to help the issuers to create and manufacture CDO tranches that meet the desired ratings. The 
trouble is that the rating agencies ended up rating products that they actually designed which 
created biasness and conflict that inappropriately influenced the ratings published by the agen-
cies to the public.  
Therefore, putting the three angles together it can be concluded that conflict of interest is most 
apparent in structured finance deals that question the accuracy of the ratings published by the 
rating agencies (SEC 2008, 25-26; Verschoor 2007, 11). 
The third main criticism is the lack of transparency. Since the subprime meltdown, it became 
obvious that the rating agencies did not sufficiently disclose information allowing investors to 
understand how they derived the ratings and to correctly understand their assumptions. This 
made it more difficult for market participants to adequately make informed investment decisions. 
Thus, lack of transparency was a further criticism against the rating agencies, especially since the 
ratings of CDOs did not fully and clearly reflect the true quality of the underlying assets and 
therefore giving a false impression about the true risk embedded in the different tranches. Also, 
the investors had little understanding about the inner structuring of the CDO tranches and also 
they lacked critical information about how the rating agencies had reached the published ratings 
of such products because the rating agencies failed to disclose adequate information regarding 
their rating techniques for such sophisticated and novel products (Frost 2006, 10-11).  
With the same token, the rating agencies are blamed of applying the same rating schemes of tra-
ditional financial products like bonds to rate the complex structured CDOs. Despite the fact that 
structured finance instruments posses different risk characteristics and the failure of the agencies 
to clearly communicate that, the use of the same rating schemes for two different financial prod-
ucts led to misinterpretations in the global financial markets and to risk miscalculation by the 
market participants (Rudolph and Scholz 2008, 1-5).  
To conclude, the three major criticisms that the rating agencies had faced since the fall of the US 
subprime mortgage market resulted in a loss of confidence in the ratings that the CRAs published 
to the extent that the liquidity of the structured finance market had turned from highly-active 




The failures by the CRAs with rating structured finance products and due to their central role in 
the financial markets, the international regulatory bodies in the US and EU were provoked and 
proposed a regulatory reform. These proposals addressed issues like 
  subjecting the CRAs to behavioral standards to manage conflict of interests,  
  improve transparency,  
  and, most importantly, to set a registering regime to subject the CRAs to increased super-
vision. 
Hence, the prime objective of the regulation is to stabilize the financial system, and to prevent 
the reoccurrence of similar chain events that adversely affected the wellbeing of world econo-
mies.    
It is proposed that the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US must have clearer au-
thorities and to subject the CRAs to explicit legislation. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
conflict of interest became critical because of the agencies’ active involvement with their clients 
who explicitly pay the rating agencies fees. The focus now is that such relationships with the 
rating committee and their clients must be closely monitored by the regulators, and the regulation 
states that the rating committee that approves the ratings should not make proposals and recom-
mendations, either formally or informally, concerning the rating deals in order to manage any 
potential conflict of interest. For example, the CRAs shall be prohibited to offer advice regarding 
the design of structured finance products for the issuers to meet their desired ratings (SLC 2010, 
886).  
Thus, the consulting and advisory services on credit enhancements to qualify the issuer for 
higher-ratings which led to conflict of interest shall be managed under the regulatory proposal 
because the agencies are not allowed to rate the securities if they had an active part in the securi-
tization process and/or the design of structured finance deals (Dam 2010, 51).  Additionally, to 
avoid biased incentives, there shall be a separation of ratings from sales and marketing activities 
by the rating committees in order to avoid influence by the clients and to mitigate conflict of 
interest. Moreover, it is asked to provide alternative paying and compensation schemes rather 
than the issuer-paying model in order to motivate the rating agencies to issue more accurate rat-
ings and to avoid any conflict of interest that may arise (SLC 2010, 886; Kiff 2010, 10).    7 
 
 
Therefore, the most radical measure to reduce conflict of interest is to move to a ‘performance-
based’ model than ‘issuer-paying’ model. In this model the issuers pay a minimum start-up fee at 
the beginning of the rating deal, and the remaining amount of the rating fee has to be paid over 
an agreed time frame based on the ultimate accuracy of the published ratings (Kiff 2010, 10).  
Also, it is proposed to increase the accountability and litigation of the CRAs since the reform 
calls for effective internal control structure that shall control and govern the implementation of 
and the observance to the policies, and techniques for determining the ratings published to the 
financial markets (SLC 2010, 850; Kiff 2010, 2). The aim of having an internal governance and 
independent compliance departments is to ensure that the CRAs are managing any inherit con-
flict of interests and to review the rating methodologies on a regular basis (Utzig 2010, 16).  
Allowing the CRAs to set their own internal code of conduct requires regulatory supervision to 
ensure that there are no deviations from the regulations by the agencies; therefore the rating 
agencies shall be subject to registration in order to better regulate and supervise them according 
to one international umbrella and a common regulatory approach. When a rating agency is regis-
tered, then the regulatory bodies can exert supervisory and investigatory powers, and thus the 
CRAs shall be dealt with as any gatekeeper such as investment firms that are subject to regula-
tion and legal liability (Financial Institutions Advisory 2009, 3; Lannoo 2008, 3). Registering the 
rating agencies provides a better mechanism and increased supervisory powers to ensure effec-
tive enforcement of the regulation (Commission of the European Community 2008, 9-10).   
The regulatory reform addresses the need to increase the legal liability of the CRAs by giving the 
SEC the authority to revoke the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) 
designation if it is found that any rating agency published credit ratings based on inadequate fi-
nancial and managerial resources to issue ratings with integrity. Also, the regulation requires that 
the rating agencies should not publish any structured finance ratings unless reliable data is avail-
able and that the quality of information about the new deal is satisfactory enough to issue credi-
ble ratings. Additionally, the proposal is aiming at requiring the CRAs to publish an additional 
symbol in order to distinguish the structured finance ratings from any traditional ratings for the 
sake of capturing the difference between the structured finance products such as the CDOs that 
behave differently than any other rated instrument (SEC, 27-28, Utzig, 2010, 16).       8 
 
 
Furthermore, the European Commission (EC) is introducing a centralized EU oversight of CRAs 
in which the CRAs that are operating in the EU should be registered. The registration is mandat-
ing them to follow a code of conduct that reduces conflict of interest and increases transparency. 
Gradually, the regulatory reliance on the CRAs by policymakers is expected to be reduced in 
laws and bank regulations at the same time of enhancing the CRAs regulatory oversight that 
shall in return reduce shop-rating by issuers and enhance competition in the rating industry since 
that the CRAs shall not be captive players in the financial markets (Kiff 2010, 12, 14, 28).  
In addition, the regulation is addressing another critical aspect which is improving transparency 
for the sake of investor-protection: the CRAs are asked to provide and publish annual reports, 
financial and inspection reports and a publication of each rating that discloses the methodologies 
and procedures used in the rating process of a specific deal (SLC 2010, 859, 864) as well as the 
quality of underlying collateral assets in any structured finance deal. Moreover, the rating agen-
cies are asked to keep free and public the historic records of the rated instruments and to disclose 
performance information about initial ratings in a timely manner and any relevant changes in 
order to enable the investors to compare rating instruments and rating agencies (Herring and 
Kane 2010, 18-20). Not only that, the CRAs shall be required to disclose information about their 
own due-diligence, their assumptions and any stress scenarios performed in order to help market 
participants with their investment decisions. Also, it is being suggested that the CRAs should be 
transparent about the quantitative rating models applied by publishing a description of their rat-
ing processes including methodologies and procedures, and also to be transparent about how they 
internally validate their ratings (Kiff 2010, 11, 28) 
Lastly, the federal regulators are proposing to find a replacement for the credit rating agencies 
after the rating disaster that contributed to the US housing bust and to the global recession. The 
regulators are targeting to eliminate the extreme reliance on the rating agencies in rules for bank 
capital and in assessing the risk of investments (Gordon 2010). Regulators claim that mitigating 
the critical role of and reliance on CRAs became vital after they led the world economies down 
when the agencies published high ratings on toxic securities based on untested models and opti-
mistic assumptions (Adler 2010).  
In the wake of the subprime crisis, the paramount role of the rating agencies was criticized and 
regulatory measures were put forward in order to enhance financial stability and to subject the    9 
 
 
rating agencies to increased supervision and regulation. But history repeats itself and nowadays 
the rating agencies are once again put under fire and their role is amplified regarding country-
ratings and they are highly criticized because of their sharp and sudden downgrades of European 
Sovereign debt.  
4. The Role of CRAs in the European Debt Crisis 
Despite being discredited by their role in the financial crisis, the important role of the rating 
agencies for the financial markets could again be recognized when they severely downgraded 
European sovereign debt, including Greek, Spanish and Portuguese. This again was an incident 
that confirmed how the credit rating agencies had failed the market; showing how weak they are 
in trailing events in the financial world and also that their pricing of risk and their credit analyses 
sometimes lag behind market realities (Warner 2010).   
History shows that the credit rating agencies have been critical players in the most systemic cri-
ses by creating bubbles through assigning top notch ratings to debt instruments that did not de-
serve such high ratings leading to the misallocation of capital in the global financial markets and 
to weak investment strategies. Not only that, the rating agencies make the situation even worse 
when they rush to significantly downgrade the initial ratings to junk status; contributing to a cri-
sis of confidence and financial instability (Warner 2010). This could be seen when the rating 
agencies reacted by heavily downgrading sovereign debt in the Eurozone; leaving financial mar-
kets volatile and triggering a European-wide crisis (Reisen 2010).  
Even though Greece has a history of weak economic outlook and budgetary problems such as 
large deficits and concerns for growth prospects, still the prominent rating agencies believed that 
the Greek government debt is a safe investment and it took the agencies long time to issue warn-
ings on the riskiness of the debt default level (Jinwei 2010).  In late April, the rating agencies had 
started their continuous downgrades by firstly rushing to cut down Greek debt to the lowest level 
of junk status, and also spreading their downgrades to other countries such as Spain and Portugal 
which in return had resulted in busting national economies through the sharp and sudden down-
grades of the agencies’ inaccurate ratings of sovereign debt (Jinwei 2010, Warner 2010).  
The tragedy continues when the sudden and severe cutting down of sovereign debt by the rating 
agencies did not stop at Greece, nevertheless the agencies have been red-flagging Spanish sover-   10 
 
 
eign debt and announcing downgrades of Spain’s debt ratings as their economy still suffers from 
its real estate crisis. Moody’s had downgraded Spanish debt because of shrinking economic 
growth, budget deficits, and increasing borrowing costs leading to the fact that the Euro-Zone 
debt crisis is spreading to other countries after the agencies started to downgrade Greece along 
with Spain (Brown and Ross-Thomson 2010, Mallet 2010). 
Amid those downgrades of Greek and Spanish debt, fears and panics were provoked concerning 
European sovereign debt problems and about the weakening of the Euro-currency when the three 
prominent rating agencies further downgraded its rating on Portugal as well as on Ireland be-
cause of the negative financial outlook of such attacked countries (GuardianBlog 2010).  Adding 
up to Greece and Spain, the agencies are blowing the Eurozone market stability by their continu-
ous downgrading of Portugal and Ireland simply because the agencies have changed their posi-
tive outlook on the countries’ economic performance. Not only that, the agencies are expecting 
to further downgrade Irish debt within a 12-24 time frame since their latest cutting down of Ire-
land’s rating in October because of Ireland’s weak and slow growth of its economy (Brown 
2010). 
Given their continuous chain of downgrades of European sovereign debt, the rating agencies are 
further criticized about their rating performances and how they create boom-bust cycles. Also, 
the agencies are being accused of reflecting the true default risk of the sovereign debt too late 
and in a rush leading to severe market fears and a spill-over effect across global markets because 
simply a downgrade by one agency is always followed by another creating the fear of contagion 
in the area (Jinwei 2010). Thus, the EU criticized the approach to the Greek crisis when the 
CRAs severely downgraded the country’s rating to junk status implying that the risk of Greece 
defaulting increased and the chance of meeting their debt obligations decreased sparking a crisis 
of confidence throughout Europe (Wachman 2010).   
Accordingly, attacks have been redirected to the agencies in response to their reaction to the 
Greek debt crisis and how they chased the economy to another downturn when the Eurozone 
ratings proved to be failing which was another wake-up call for European leaders to ask for 
stricter standards under the European Law to regulate the rating agencies (Reisen 2010).  
To conclude, it is being questionable once more that the rating agencies triggered the European 
debt crisis, and severe discussions are ongoing regarding the relationship between the rating    11 
 
 
agencies with their clients highlighting that the rating agencies are more likely to issue high rat-
ings to the debt they are asked to rate by the debt issuers. Thus, it is important for the financial 
regulators to take a closer look at the rating agencies and ways to better regulate the agencies 
with regard to the inherit conflict of interest arising from the fact that the agencies are paid by 
their clients and not the investors highlighting that their business model is semi-corrupt and also 
ignoring the fact that the agencies base their sovereign ratings only on publicly-available data 
(Jinwei 2010, Reisen 2010, Warner 2010). 
5. Conclusion 
The two most recent crises are wakeup calls for a development in the regulation of CRAs as be-
ing proposed in the US and in the EU. The agencies’ critical position in the markets to the extent 
that a downgrade by any agency would result in dramatic and immediate adverse outcome, lead-
ing to a spillover effect and therefore destabilizing global financial markets. Major downgrades 
do not only impact the financial markets of a specific country but also the negative outlook reach 
to other countries since the financial markets are globally interrelated.  
After the major discussions of CRAs’ regulation and increased supervision, we can see that to 
date there is no evidence that put the proposals to any realized application. Even though the new-
est Basel III lost focus on the failing role of the CRAs, so the question remains when the regula-
tors are going to subject the rating agencies to increased regulation and supervision amid their 
failures in rating toxic structured finance instruments and of country debts.  
It is of paramount importance to highlight that the subprime crisis was not the first and will most 
probably not the last that showed how critical are the rating agencies and how significant it is to 
better regulate such agencies and enhance their supervision, yet there is no concrete application 
of any of the proposed measures still leaving the gap of credit rating agencies’ regulation empty. 
In conclusion, since the regulatory rules and proposed measures have not been realized, the 
agencies still don’t have to disclose information about their rating methodologies to enhance 
transparency, and they are also not subject to new corporate governance standards to manage any 
inherit conflict of interest. The credit rating agency issue is important and needs urgent attention 
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